



Center for Slavic and East European Studies

University of California  
Berkeley, California  
94720

# Newsletter

Spring, 1995  
Vol. 12 No. 2

## Notes from the Chair

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As I begin my second semester as Chair of the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, the grave situation in Chechnya remains unresolved. The civil war in the Northern Caucasus has raised alarm and concern all over the world and will almost certainly have negative repercussions for Russia's internal political situation and foreign relations. Before the crisis erupted, most of us knew little about this remote part of Russia or its turbulent history. Berkeley is fortunate to have two colleagues who are knowledgeable about this area: Professor Johanna Nichols of the Slavic Department and Dr. Edward Walker, Executive Director of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. Contributions from both appear in the Newsletter.

We have had a busy fall, with many outstanding lecturers and other events, including visits by the Czech Ambassador to the US, Michael Zantovsky, and the Russian Consul General in San Francisco, Vladimir S. Kuznetsov. In mid-November, many of us went to the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, held this year in Philadelphia. My encounters with representatives of other centers made me realize, more keenly than ever, that Slavic studies at Berkeley have continued to flourish—even under stringent budgetary conditions—because our administration has provided unflinching support for faculty and research with a focus on the former Soviet Union and East Europe. We have lost many faculty members to retirement in recent years, but we have also made many new appointments. Searches are currently under way for new appointments in the Slavic and Political Science Departments. Campus activities in this area have never been more lively, and we have achieved an unprecedented level of coordination and collegiality among faculty as we mount a new effort to raise additional funds for our superb graduate training program.

One of our more significant accomplishments this

fall was the launching of a new program of Working Groups—small gatherings of faculty and graduate students who share common interests and meet on a regular basis. It is our belief that these kinds of encounters make an exceptionally important contribution to the intellectual environment at Berkeley in Slavic and East European studies. Sponsored jointly by the Center and the Berkeley Program on Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, Working Groups now cover a wide range of topics: "Central Asian Politics and Society," "Russian and Soviet History," "Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union and East Europe," "Literary Theory and Slavic Scholarship," "Comparative Post-Communism," and "New Approaches to Security Studies after the Cold War."

This spring we will see the results of many months of planning to bring some exciting conferences, lectures and other events to the Berkeley campus. We invite you to join us at the Pacific Film Archive on Saturday, March 4. The Center, in cooperation with other units on campus, will sponsor a special film event and symposium, "When Ivan Met Mickey: Walt Disney's Mark on Sergei Eisenstein."

"Current Prospects for Armenia," is another March symposium, scheduled for the afternoon of Friday, March 3. Leading experts on Armenia, including the Consul General of the Republic of Armenia in Los Angeles, will participate in this unique and important discussion. The entire program lies within the Newsletter. As with all Center programs, it is open to the public.

On Friday March 17, we will host the XIXth Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference which is devoted to a discussion of "Time and Money in Russian Culture." Conference participants, drawn from Berkeley and Stanford and other campuses, will address various topics relating to the conceptions, history and uses of time and money in Imperial Russia, Soviet Russia and post-Communist Russia. The

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## Notes from the Chair, continued

themes of time and money provide valuable insight into Russia's struggle to enter the modern age.

The following week, on Thursday March 23, Professor Nina Tumarkin of Wellesley College will deliver the Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture. Professor Tumarkin is well known in the field for two landmark studies: *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* and *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*. Her lecture, scheduled shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, will be entitled "The Agony of Victory: Russia Remembers World War II."

The Annual Outreach Conference will be held this year on April 7, 8, 9 on the theme, "Identities in Transition: Gender, Class, Nationality, and Religion." We will explore changes in individual and collective identities that have occurred during the past decade of rapid change in East Europe and the former Soviet Union. With many distinguished faculty participating, it promises to be a memorable weekend!

I want to extend my deepest appreciation to Associates of the Slavic Center who have recently renewed their membership and provided valuable support for the Center. Your generosity helps to make possible our forthcoming activities as well as buttresses our program of research and student training. We hope to see all our Associates at the events planned this spring! ■

Victoria E. Bonnell

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The Newsletter is published quarterly during the academic year. Please send suggestions, corrections, or inquiries to the editor(s) at the above address. Submit mailing address changes to the Center, Attn: Newsletter Mailing List; or call the Center at the above number. We welcome your comments and suggestions.

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## The IAS Concurrent MA Program

The Concurrent MA Program in International and Area Studies is a two-year Masters program for students already matriculated in one of UC Berkeley's professional or academic graduate programs. A broadly defined and interdisciplinary program, it is designed to complement other degree programs by providing the fundamentals of contemporary international issues and/or detailed knowledge on particular world regions or countries. Students tailor the content of their programs within a defined framework to suit their interests. Specific course work is chosen in strict consultation with a faculty advisor.

### Minimum requirements for the Degree:

(1) A minimum of 24 units of coursework, independent of course work undertaken for the professional/PhD degree is required, twelve units of which must be graduate-level course work. All courses must be courses offered outside the professional school or department in which the student is concurrently registered.

(2) Demonstrated proficiency in a modern foreign language relevant to the focus of program of study equivalent to the completion of four college level semesters of basic language study. None of the courses taken to fulfill this requirement can be applied toward the degree. Up to four units of advanced language courses, if relevant to the focus of the student's program, may count toward the degree.

(3) A written or oral comprehensive exam based on their program of courses.

**How to Apply:** Applications are submitted by graduate students during the Spring semester of their first year of course work at one of UCB's professional schools or within a PhD program. Students in PhD programs or professional degree programs requiring more than two years may apply in the spring semester of their second to last year of work.

More information can be obtained from the IAS Teaching Programs office 510/642-4466.



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# Who Are the Chechen?

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by *Johanna Nichols*, professor of Slavic languages and literatures  
University of California, Berkeley

*Author's note: I have been doing linguistic field work on Chechen and its close relative Ingush for many years. Most of my field work on Chechen and Ingush was made possible by the support of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX). Though I am not an ethnographer or historian, I have tried to bring together here some general information about the Chechen people and their language in order to increase public awareness of their situation and history, and to put a human face on a people of great dignity, refinement, and courage who have paid heavily for their resistance to conquest and assimilation.*

*This paper may be copied freely. If you disseminate it electronically or print it out yourself (which you are welcome to do), reformatting (font, spacing, etc.) is okay but please do not edit it.*

**Introduction.** The Chechens and their western neighbors the Ingush are distinct ethnic groups with distinct languages, but so closely related and so similar that it is convenient to describe them together. The term "Chechen" is a Russian ethnonym taken from the name of a lowlands Chechen village; "Chechnya" is derived from that. (Both words are accented on the last syllable in Russian.) This term evidently entered Russian from a Turkic language, probably Kumyk (spoken in the northern and eastern Caucasian plain). The Chechens call themselves Nokhchi (singular Nokhchuo). Similarly, "Ingush" is not the self-designation but a Russian ethnonym based on a village name; the Ingush call themselves Ghalghay.

**Demography.** 1989 census figures: 956,879 Chechen; 237,438 Ingush. The Chechens are the largest North Caucasian group and the second largest Caucasian group (after the Georgians).

**Location, settlement.** The Chechen and Ingush lands lie just to the east of the principal road crossing the central Caucasus (via the Darial Pass), extending from the foothills and plains into alpine highlands. The lowlands enjoy fertile soil, ample rainfall, a long growing season, and a small oilfield. Neighbors to the east are the various peoples of Daghestan (many of them speaking languages related to Chechen); in the plains to the north, the Turkic-speaking Kumyk and (as of the last three centuries) Russians; to the west the Ingush and to their west the Ossetians, who speak a language of the Iranian branch of Indo-European; to the south (across the central Caucasus range) the southern Ossetians and the Georgians.

There are two true cities in Chechen and Ingush territory: Grozny (pop. about 400,000 until 1995), the modern Chechen capital founded as a Russian fort during the Russian conquest of the Caucasus; and Vladikavkaz (pop. about 300,000; known as Ordzhonikidze in Soviet times) in the Ingush highlands at the Ingush-Ossetic territorial boundary, also originally a Russian

military fort and founded to control the Darial pass. Nazran in the Ingush lowlands was traditionally and is now a large and important market town. The cities had a substantial Russian and other non-Chechen-Ingush population; Vladikavkaz was mixed Ingush and Ossetic with significant numbers of Russians and Georgians. (Grozny has now been destroyed and mostly depopulated by Russian bombing. Vladikavkaz and the adjacent Ingush lands were ethnically cleansed of Ingush in late 1992.)

All Russian governments—czars, Soviets, post-Soviet Russia—have used various means to remove Chechen and Ingush population from economically important areas and to encourage settlement there by Russians and Russian Cossacks; hence the mixed population of the cities and lowlands.

**Language.** The Caucasus has been famed since antiquity for the sheer number and diversity of its languages and for the exotic grammatical structures of the language families indigenous there. This diversity testifies to millennia of generally peaceable relations among autonomous ethnic groups.

Chechen and Ingush, together with Batsbi or Tsova-Tush (a moribund minority language of Georgia) make up the Nakh branch of the Nakh-Daghestanian, or Northeast Caucasian, language family. There are over 30 languages in the Northeast Caucasian family, most of them spoken in Daghestan just to the east of Chechnya. The split of the Nakh branch from the rest of the family took place about 5000-6000 years ago (thus the Nakh-Daghestanian family is comparable in age to Indo-European, the language family ancestral to English, French, Russian, Greek, Hindi, etc.), though the split of Chechen from Ingush probably dates back only to the middle ages. The entire family is indigenous to the Caucasus mountains and has no demonstrable relations to any language group either in or out of the Caucasus. Like most indigenous Caucasian languages Chechen has a wealth of consonants, including uvular and pharyngeal sounds like those of Arabic and glottalized or ejective consonants like those of many native American languages; and a large vowel system somewhat resembling that of Swedish or German. Like its sister languages Chechen has extensive inflectional morphology including a dozen nominal cases and several gender classes, and forms long and complex sentences by chaining participial clauses together. The case system is ergative, i.e., the subject of a transitive verb appears in an oblique case and the direct object is in the nominative, as is the subject of an intransitive verb (as in Basque); verbs take no person agreement, but some of them agree in gender with the direct object or intransitive subject.

Ninety-seven percent or more of the Chechens claim Chechen as their first language, though most also speak Russian, generally

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## Who Are the Chechen? continued

quite fluently. Chechen and Ingush are so close to each other that with some practice a speaker of one has fair comprehension of the other, and where the two languages are in contact they are used together: a Chechen addresses an Ingush in Chechen, the Ingush replies in Ingush, and communication proceeds more or less smoothly.

Chechen was not traditionally a written language. An orthography using the Russian alphabet was created in the 1930's and is used for various kinds of publications, although for most Chechens the chief vehicle of literacy is Russian. Traditionally, as in most North Caucasian societies, many individuals were bilingual or multilingual, using an important lowlands language (e.g. Kumyk, spoken in market towns and prestigious as its speakers were early converts to Islam) for inter-ethnic communication; any literacy was in Arabic. Russian has now displaced both Kumyk and Arabic in these functions. Particularly if the Chechen and Ingush economies continue to be destroyed and unemployment and mass homelessness continue to undermine the social structure, there is danger that Chechen and Ingush will be functionally reduced to household languages and will then yield completely to Russian, with concomitant loss of much of the cultural heritage.

**History.** The Chechens have evidently been in or near their present territory for some 6000 years and perhaps much longer; there is fairly seamless archeological continuity for the last 8000 years or more in central Daghestan, suggesting that the Nakh-Daghestanian language family is long indigenous. The Caucasian highlands were apparently relatively populous and prosperous in ancient times. From the late middle ages until the 19th century, a worldwide cooling phase known as the Little Ice Age caused glacial advances and shortened growing seasons in the alpine highlands, weakening the highland economies and triggering migrations to the lowlands and abandonment of some alpine villages. This period of economic hardship coincided with the Russian conquest of the Caucasus which lasted from the late 1500's to the mid-1800's.

In all of recorded history and inferable prehistory the Chechens (and for that matter the Ingush) have never undertaken battle except in defense. The Russian conquest of the Caucasus was difficult and bloody, and the Chechens and Ingush with their extensive lowlands territory and access to the central pass were prime targets and were among the most tenacious defenders. Russia destroyed lowlands villages and deported, exiled, or slaughtered the civilian population, forcing capitulation of the highlands. Numerous refugees migrated or were deported to various Muslim countries of the Middle East, and to this day there are Chechen populations in Jordan and Turkey. Since then there have been various Chechen rebellions against Russian and Soviet power, as well as resistance to collectivization, anti-religious campaigns, and russification.

In 1944 the Chechens and Ingush, together with the Karachay-Balkar, Crimean Tatars, and other nationalities were deported *en masse* to Kazakhstan and Siberia, losing at least one-quarter and perhaps half of their population in transit. Though "rehabilitated" in 1956 and allowed to return in 1957, they lost land, economic resources, and civil rights; since then, under both Soviet and post-Soviet governments, they have been the objects of (official and unofficial) discrimination and discriminatory public discourse. In recent years, Russian media have depicted the Chechen nation and/or nationality as thugs and bandits responsible for organized crime and street violence in Russia.

In late 1992 Russian tanks and troops, sent to the north Caucasus ostensibly as peacekeepers in an ethnic dispute between Ingush and Ossetians over traditional Ingush lands politically incorporated into North Ossetia after the 1944 deportation, forcibly removed the Ingush population from North Ossetia and destroyed the Ingush villages there; there were many deaths and there are now said to be up to 60,000 refugees in Ingushetia (about one-quarter of the total Ingush population). In developments reminiscent of today's invasion of Chechnya, in the weeks leading up to the action the Ingush were depicted (inaccurately) in regional media as heavily armed and poised for a large-scale and organized attack on Ossetians, and the Russian military once deployed appears to have undertaken ethnic cleansing at least partly on its own initiative. (My only sources of information for this paragraph are Russian and western news reports. Helsinki Watch is preparing a report for publication in early 1995.) The invasion of Chechnya presently underway has meant great human suffering for all residents of the Chechen lowlands, including Russians, but only the Chechens are at risk of ethnic cleansing, wholesale economic ruin, and loss of linguistic and cultural heritage.

**Religion.** The Chechens and Ingush are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, having converted in the late 17th to early 19th centuries. Islam is now, as it has been since the conversion, moderate but strongly held and a central component of the culture and the ethnic identity.

**Economy, customs.** Traditionally, the lowlands Chechen were grain farmers and the highlanders raised sheep. At the time of Russian contact the lowlands were wealthy and produced a grain surplus, while the highlands were not self-sufficient in food and traded wool and eggs for lowlands grain.

Chechen social structure and ethnic identity rest on principles of family and clan honor, respect for and deference to one's elders, hospitality, formal and dignified relations between families and clans, and courteous and formal public and private behavior.

Kinship and clan structure are patriarchal, but women have full social and professional equality and prospects for financial independence equivalent to those of men. Academics, writers,



artists, and intellectuals in general are well versed in the cultures of both the European and the Islamic worlds, and the society as a whole can be said to regard both of these heritages as their own together with the indigenous north Caucasian artistic and intellectual tradition.

**Social organization.** Until the Russian conquest the Chechens were an independent nation with their own language and territory but no formal political organization. Villages were autonomous, as were clans. Villages had mutual defense obligations in times of war, and clans had mutual support relations that linked them into larger clan confederations (which generally coincided with dialects). Each clan was headed by a respected elder. There were no social classes and no differences of rank apart from those of age, kinship, and earned social honor. ■

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## Summer in Siberia and the Sierra Nevada

The Tahoe-Baikal Institute announces its fifth annual international environmental exchange. The program takes place from June 25 to August 27, 1995, at Lake Tahoe in California and Nevada, and at Lake Baikal in Siberia. Open to upper-division undergrads, recent grads, and graduate students. Program fee is \$1,200. Financial assistance may be available in special cases. Applications due March 1. For more information: Attn: Application Request, Tahoe-Baikal Institute, P. O. Box 13587, South Lake Tahoe, CA 96151-3587. Tel (916) 542-5593; Fax (916) 542-5568; e-mail: ctctbisct@igc.apc.org



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# The Crisis in Chechnya

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by *Edward W. Walker*, executive director  
*Berkeley Program for Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies*

On February 15, 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Mintimir Shaimiev, President of the Republic of Tatarstan, initialed a treaty delineating a division of powers between the Russian national government and the government of Tatarstan. The treaty afforded Tatarstan a considerable amount of autonomy, and was welcomed by Yeltsin's Nationalities Minister, Sergei Shakhrai, as a "breakthrough." Similar treaties were signed in the following months with the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Bashkortostan. These treaties, Yeltsin argued at the time, represented a "fine-tuning" of Russia's evolving federation relations, the basic framework of which had been established by the new Russian Constitution of December 1993. Indeed, with parliamentary elections approaching in the fall of 1995 and presidential elections in June 1996, he and his advisors began confidently asserting that the main achievement of Yeltsin's tenure was the consolidation of Russia's territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, Moscow still faced some extremely difficult problems in its relations with local governments and in keeping ethnic tensions from boiling over into more conflict within Russia. Above all, there was the explosive situation in the North Caucasus. There, among other problems, the breakaway republic of Chechnya continued to refuse to consider itself a part of the Russian Federation.

Until the summer of 1994, Moscow's response to Chechnya's challenge had been very patient. After an initial effort to impose martial law after Chechnya's declaration of independence ended in failure in late 1991, Moscow adopted what amounted to a policy of benign neglect toward Chechnya and its President, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Although it refused to recognize Chechnya's independence, Moscow allowed the republic to go its own way and even attempted periodically to enter into negotiations with Dudayev. Moreover, Yeltsin, his advisors, and members of the government repeatedly asserted that under no condition would force be used to resolve their differences with the republic. And in the wake of the signing of the treaties with Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Bashkortostan, they also expressed the hope that these treaties would serve as a model for finding a negotiated solution with Chechnya. As Yeltsin put it in a speech in early August of last year, "Forcible intervention in Chechnya is impermissible.... we in Russia have succeeded in avoiding inter-ethnic clashes only because we have refrained from forcible pressure. If we violate this principle with regard to Chechnya, the Caucasus will rise up. There will be so much turmoil and blood that afterwards no one will forgive us."

Even as these words were being spoken, however, Moscow began stepping up financial and military support for opposition forces in Chechnya. Fighting in the republic intensified over the

summer, leading in November to a major attack on Grozny by the combined forces of the Chechen opposition in an effort to overthrow Dudayev. Despite support from helicopters and aircraft with Russian markings, as well as from "mercenaries" from the Russia military (it later turned out, despite the denials of the Ministry of Defense, that these "mercenaries" had in fact been acting under orders), the attack failed. A little more than a week later, Yeltsin issued a decree authorizing the government, including the military, to take all necessary steps to disarm "illegal armed formations" in the republic. Two days later, 40,000 Russian troops poured into Chechnya.

Yeltsin's words of warning in August proved prophetic—there was indeed great "turmoil and bloodshed" as Russian forces met fierce resistance from Chechen fighters. Despite an earlier boast by the Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, that Russian troops could take the city in a matter of hours, the initial thrusts of Russian armored columns into the capital were rebuffed with considerable loss of life and equipment. Rather than a rapid and relatively bloodless victory, the Russian military found itself pummeling Grozny with artillery, bombing it indiscriminately from the air, and fighting its way into the heart of the city house-by-house, street-by-street. Only in late January did Russian troops manage to take the Presidential Palace. Even then, Russia faced the daunting task of occupying southern Grozny and "pacifying" Chechen forces who retreated into the mountains to the south. Given the traditions of armed resistance to Moscow of the Chechen people, the mountainous terrain that is ideal for a drawn out guerrilla war, and the horror and resentment caused by the destruction of Grozny, the best that Russia can hope for is that Chechnya will become its Northern Ireland.

The political consequences in Moscow of the Chechen invasion have also been dramatic. Democrats in Moscow almost universally condemned the decision to invade, and most have announced they will no longer support Yeltsin. Economically, the invasion threatens to break Russia's budget, fueling inflation and undermining prospects for further financial relief from the IMF and aid from Western governments. And Russia appears to be an even more unstable and threatening place to foreign investors than previously. As for foreign policy, the invasion has greatly strained the already deteriorating political relations between Moscow and the United States. But perhaps the most disturbing consequence of the invasion is that it took place just as the first signs of political and economic stabilization were beginning to appear in Russia.

The critical question, then, is why did Yeltsin make such a massive blunder? Why, after showing considerable patience with Chechnya and other republics for three years, and after promising



in such blunt language not to use force to resolve Russia's federation problems, was a decision made first to overthrow Dudayev by supporting the Chechen opposition, and when that failed, to launch a full scale invasion?

Before answering these questions, an initial point is in order. It is quite clear that the policy on Chechnya after early 1994 was being made by Yeltsin and his advisors. The intervention was not the result of the scheming of some military cabal or low level conspirators. As early as August 15, while taking a vacation trip down the Volga, Yeltsin indicated that policy on Chechnya had changed. He revealed that "certain measures" were being taken in Chechnya that he could not disclose, an apparent reference to the decision to use the Chechen opposition to overthrow Dudayev. Later, the decision to invade in December was made at a Security Council meeting, which Yeltsin chairs; the November 29 ultimatum demanding that the Chechens lay down their arms in 48 hours was issued by Yeltsin himself; and the December 9 decree ordering the government to take all means necessary to bring Chechnya to heel was signed by Yeltsin. Finally, Yeltsin has himself repeatedly insisted that he has been in firm control of policy on Chechnya, despite his evident displeasure with the performance of the military.

Why, then, did Yeltsin do it? As in any such decision, a number of factors were doubtless involved, but I would point to the following as being particularly important. First, efforts to negotiate with Dudayev had reached a dead end by the early summer of 1994. Beginning in January 1994, Moscow made a concerted effort to arrive at a compromise. Shakhrai (whom the Chechens had reportedly objected to) was sacked as Minister of Nationalities; Moscow indicated it would recognize Dudayev as the legitimate leader of Chechnya (despite the highly suspect character of his "election" in November 1991), dropping demands for a new Chechen constitution and new elections; and an offer was made for a meeting between Yeltsin and Dudayev.

Unfortunately, just as it appeared that a meeting would be held, an attempt was made on Dudayev's life. On May 27, a car bomb badly damaged Dudayev's car and killed the Chechen Interior Minister and one of his deputies. Initially, Dudayev claimed that the bomb had been set by opponents of his first steps at rapprochement with Moscow, but shortly thereafter the Chechen government announced that Moscow was behind the assassination attempt. (Who actually planted the bomb is not clear—there are many potential candidates, but it seems hard to believe that Yeltsin was involved.) Predictably, talk of a meeting between Yeltsin and Dudayev and a negotiated solution came to a halt, and Dudayev retreated to his previous position that Moscow must first recognize Chechnya as independent state before negotiations could begin. It was at that point, in late July, that Moscow began stepping up pressure on Dudayev by supporting the opposition.

Second, the decision was probably made not return to Moscow's previous policy of benign neglect in July because of a perception that Chechnya presented a genuine and mounting security threat to Russia. This threat was real—certainly much more so than had been the case with Grenada or Panama prior to the U.S. invasions of what, after all, were foreign countries. It included a constant flow of arms and drugs from the republic; frequent hijackings and robberies, particular of the train that passes through Grozny and represents Moscow's principal transportation link with Azerbaijan; the generalized arming of the Chechen population; persistent factional and clan violence in the republic; a significant out-migration of Russians; the activities of the "Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus," which, headquartered in Chechnya, threatened to unite the Moslem peoples of the North Caucasus in opposition to Russia; the fact that Chechnya was complicating Moscow's efforts to ameliorate ethnic tensions elsewhere in the North Caucasus (e.g., between the Ingush and Ossetians or between Chechens and local Cossacks); and the possibility that Chechen intransigence would make Moscow look weak, thereby encouraging other republics and regions to challenge Moscow's authority by, *inter alia*, refusing to meet their financial obligations to the center.

Finally, there was the very important question of oil. Oil production in Chechnya itself is modest and had been declining for years, even before perestroika. By 1994, it represented only some 0.5 percent of the total output of Russia. The real issue was not oil in Chechnya but rather oil (and natural gas) passing through the republic. Unfortunately for Moscow, a major pipeline runs right through Grozny. The pipeline (actually, three separate pipelines) has been occasionally sabotaged and frequently shutdown as a result of the chaos in Chechnya (although it appears that all three were never out-of-service at the same time). Moreover, the Chechens had reportedly perfected the art of stealing oil and gas from the pipeline, resulting in the loss of tens of millions of dollars in earnings for Moscow.

The most important oil-related factor, however, was probably the consideration that Moscow was negotiating two extremely lucrative pipeline deals, both of which entail shipping oil and gas through Grozny to the Black Sea ports of Novorossiisk (Russia) and Tuapse (Georgia). The first is with the so-called "Caspian Consortium," which is planning to develop the enormous oil and gas reserves off Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea. The second is with another consortium developing the huge Tenghiz oil field in Kazakhstan. And in both cases, building an additional pipeline by-passing Chechnya would be very expensive and would make it much more difficult to convince producers to use the Russian route. So too would a conclusion that Russia is unable to guarantee the security of its existing pipelines.

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## *The Crisis in Chechnya, continued*

Finally, Yeltsin appears to have been told that an invasion of Chechnya could be accomplished relatively quickly and with far less bloodshed than has proven the case. Had the invasion been efficiently executed, he probably also assumed that the reaction of the Russian public would have been favorable. Ethnic Russians are particularly hostile to the Muslim minorities of the North Caucasus generally and to the Chechens particularly. They believe they are deeply involved in crime, and they resent the fact that they have been very successful merchants, running many of the fruit and vegetable markets throughout Russia. Yeltsin could have expected the Russian people to welcome a "disciplining" of the rebellious republic and a restoration of "order" by a firm and decisive Russian president. He also probably felt that, much like many American presidents before him, not doing anything about a security threat would undermine his own authority and his claim to having overcome Russia's crisis of statehood.


Rather than demonstrating the efficacy of a "firm hand," however, the woefully planned and executed invasion has in fact humiliated both Yeltsin and the Russian military. It has also made the Russian state look very feeble, and may thereby add significantly to centrifugal pressures. And it has if anything made oil and natural gas producers in the Caspian and western Kazakhstan less inclined to ship their product through Russia.

Still, while the decision to intervene was a terrible mistake, particularly given the extremely brutal and ham-handed way it was carried out, it is also important to appreciate that Dudayev had placed Yeltsin between a rock and a hard place. Indeed, the decision to invade was not made by a man intent on ruining democracy or ethnically cleansing the North Caucasus. Rather, it represented a serious political misjudgment rooted in a profound failure to appreciate the military and political consequences of an invasion. ■

## ***630 th Anniversary of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow***

The 630th Anniversary of the Founding of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow was celebrated in elegant style at the Polonaise Ball, an annual event presented by the Polish Arts and Culture Foundation. In addition, the President of the Foundation, Mrs. Wanda Tomczykowska, initiated a visit to Berkeley by the Chancellor of the Jagiellonian University, Prof. Dr. Hab. Aleksander Koj. On Monday, November 7, several distinguished guests of the Polish Arts and Culture Foundation joined Professor Koj in a luncheon and panel discussion on "Poland Today." The Slavic Center provided an appreciative audience which included Richard Buxbaum, Dean of International and Area Studies, who presided over the event; Professor emeritus Czeslaw Milosz, an old friend of Chancellor Koj; and several of our ASC sponsors.

The Polish Arts and Culture Foundation has created a very special t-shirt, using the names and signatures of famous Polish writers, scholars, musicians, and the like. It is very attractive and extremely creative. For one of your own, contact the Polish Arts and Culture Foundation, 1290 Sutter Street, San Francisco 94109. Tel: (415) 474-7070; Fax: (415) 474-7149.





# Faculty, Student, and Scholar Notes

With sadness, we announce the passing of **Barbara Jelavich**, distinguished historian and Cal graduate. Professor Jelavich leaves a significant scholarly legacy that included seventeen books and a great many Ph.D.'s. She succumbed to a battle with cancer on Sunday, January 15, 1995.

**Mark Bassin**, who received his Ph.D. from Cal in the Department of Geography, has recently accepted a position as Lecturer in Geography at the University College, London. He had been Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

**Nicholas Riasanovsky**, professor of history, has been unanimously selected to receive the American Historical Association's "Award for Scholarly Distinction." The bestowal of the award was done at the annual meeting of the AHA in early January of this year. The honor was established in 1984 and first awarded in 1985. Through the years, distinguished historians have been so honored. Once again, Berkeley has just reason to be proud of a member of its stellar faculty.

**Congratulations to Anna Wertz**—first-year graduate student in Russian History for winning the AAASS (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies) National Graduate Student Essay Contest. Her paper, "A Perspicuous Mirror: Feodor Sologub and the Spiritual Crisis in Turn-of-the-Century Russia," was chosen unanimously for the prize.

## **IREX "Scholars In Action" from Berkeley**

**Maria Fernandez-Gimenez** is with the Mongolian Academy of Sciences studying pastoralism in transition: the ecology, perceptions, and herding practices of Mongolian nomads.

**Sarah Cover** (History) is connected with the Miklukho-Maklai Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology. She is researching "Contrasting conceptions: popular and

elite approaches to illness in Moscow and Smolensk, 1864-1914."

**William McKee** (History), at the Institute of History in St. Petersburg, is working on his thesis topic, "Taming the green serpent: alcoholism, autocracy, and the Russian society."

**Susan Morrissey** (Ph.D., History, 1993) is engaged in research on suicide and civilization in *fin de siecle* Russia, but is not affiliated with a particular institution there. She had been teaching at the University of Kentucky.

Three Ph.D. candidates in history are studying at the Institute of Russian Literature. **John Randolph** is researching his thesis on the Bakunin family. **David Rogers** is conducting a study of the "Iusupovs and Russian noble political culture, 1900-1917." **Robert Wessling** is examining disease mythology in the later 19th century Russia, specifically "the case of Semion Nadson."

**Valerie Sperling** (Political Science) is at the Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market. The topic of her research is "Engendering transition: the women's movements in Russia and Ukraine."

## **Foreign IREX Scholars at Berkeley**

Four IREX scholars in linguistics have been at the Berkeley campus this fall: **Gayane Hagopian**, from the Institute of Language of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, is continuing her research on anthropological linguistics. She will be teaching Armenian through the department of linguistics at Cal. **Nino Shenge-laia**, from Tbilisi State University, came to Berkeley to do research on syntax and text linguistics. **Valentina Shmatova** from University of Balti in Moldova was engaged in the study of "irony." **Yelena Belyaeva**, Voronezh State University, continued her study of sociolinguistics.

## **The Drago and Danica Kosovac Prize**

for outstanding theses (Senior or Honors) in the Social Sciences and/or Humanities which research some aspect of Serbian history or culture  
Examples of suggested topics: "Church and State in Serbia;" "Women in Serbian Arts, Literature, and Education;" "Nikola Tesla: His Life and Times;" or "A Critical Study of Russian-Serbian Relations in Past and Present;" and others.

*For further information,  
please contact*

**Barbara Voytek,**  
**Executive Director**  
**Center for Slavic &**  
**East European Studies**  
**643-6736;**

**bvoytek@uclink.berkeley.edu**

In addition, **Olga Latina** from the International Academy of Business and Banking has been at Berkeley doing research on the linguistics semantics of idioms and **Elena Martynova**, Institute of National Economy, has been examining the maintenance of native languages of small groups within a larger assimilated culture. **Elena Shamina** from St. Petersburg State University has been engaged in research on psycholinguistics and phonology.

Expected at Cal in the spring seminar are IREX scholars **Alexei Istomin** from the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, **Pavel Parshin** from the Analytical Center of the National Academy of Science, and

*continued on next page*



## *Notes, continued*

**Sergey Ivanov** from the Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies.

**Ekaterina Porchneva**, Institute of Oriental Studies, was an IREX scholar at the Center during the fall. She had been examining problems of sectarianism, which she continues during the spring at Harvard University.

## *Scholar from Siberia at IURD*

**Emma Koreysha** is Assistant Director for International Relations of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Siberia. She is working with Manuel Castells Chair of the Center for West European Studies, on the study of comparative regional development.

## *Visiting Faculty—Spring 1995*

**Fuada Stankovic** is returning to the Berkeley campus to teach a course in the Department of Economics and PEIS. Professor Stankovic received her PhD in economics from the School of Economics, University of Belgrade. She is currently a Professor in Political Economy within the School of Law at the University of Novi Sad and Director of the Law School Center for Economic Research there as well. In addition, she has held several important international positions and has been visiting professor within the US—most recently, here at Berkeley last year. She is a specialist on the political economy of entrepreneurship and has published extensively on this and other topics.

**Vladimir L. Zhobov**, Senior Assistant, Department of Slavic Philologies, Sofia University, continues his teaching and research in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. Dr. Zhobov is a key participant in the "Modern Phonetic Study of the Inventory of Sounds of Bulgarian Dialects," on which he collaborates with Professor Ronelle Alexander. Several graduate students are also active in this major research project.

**Victor M. Zhivov** is teaching again in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures. Dr. Zhivov is a professor in the department of Russian language at Moscow State University. His areas of research in-

clude history of the Russian language and Slavic literary languages and East Slavic cultural history. His expertise lies in the history of pre-modern Russia, especially of the Petrine era.



## *Negotiating Membership in the National Community*

The Joint Committee on Southeast Asia of the SSRC and the ACLS is sponsoring a dissertation workshop for advanced graduate students in the social sciences and humanities who are investigating issues of nationalism and cultural citizenship in either Eastern Europe (including the former Soviet Union) or Southeast Asia.

The three-day workshop will take place in Chicago, May 19-21, 1995. Applicants should submit: a copy of their dissertation research proposal or an 8-10 page outline or abstract of completed research; a current cv; a cover letter explaining the contribution of their project to the workshop. Complete applications should be sent no later than February 15 to:

**Southeast Asia Program,  
Social Science Research Council,  
605 Third Avenue,  
NYC 10158.**



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# Graduate Student and Faculty Working Groups

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In the fall of 1994, the Center, together with the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, launched a new program to support Berkeley faculty and student research and interaction. Based on previous models of "working groups," modest support is offered toward those who organize a series of regular meetings for a specific constituency to discuss specific issues related to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Assistance for each working groups does not exceed \$300 annually, and funds can be used for expenses such as photocopying, refreshments, supplies, etc.

To apply for a grant toward a working group, faculty and/or students must prepare a 1-2 page proposal which clearly states the topic of the group and the significance of organizing a regular meeting to address that topic. In addition, it should indicate the membership of the group, the time and place of meetings as well as their frequency. If necessary, arrangements can be made for meetings in the Slavic Center conference room in 270 Stephens. Finally, the organizers must indicate the way in which they plan to disseminate the work of the group. Questions can be directed toward the

Executive Directors: Ned Walker at 642-6168 or Barbara Voytek at 643-6736.

## *Extant Working Groups*

The "Russian History Group" is an informal colloquium comprised of graduate students in the department of history at UC Berkeley, their advisors, Professors Riasanovsky, Slezkine, and Zelnik, and Professor Dan Brower from UC Davis. The Russian History Group was the first working group, actually formed last year (see the Fall 1994 Newsletter for a description of last year's activities). Five presentations were featured during the fall: Greg Castillo, advanced graduate student in the department of architecture, presented a paper entitled, "Peoples at an Exhibition: Soviet Architecture and the 'National Question'"; D' Ann Penner, Ph.D. candidate in the department of history, presented the introduction to her dissertation and a chapter entitled, "Farmer-Party Interaction on the Don, 1920-34;" Robert Geraci, another history student, presented a chapter from his dissertation, entitled, "Russification against Russification: the Il'minskii System under Siege, 1891-1914." The fourth presentation was made by Page

Herrlinger, who is also the organizer of the working group. She presented a section from her dissertation-in-progress on the structure of religious life in the Russian factory, 1880-1914. David Engerman, a Ph.D. candidate in history, presented his dissertation prospectus, "America, Russia, and the Romance of Economic Development," and a supporting paper, "Modernization from the Other Shore." The Russian History Group obviously had a busy and productive semester.

Space allows us to only list the other groups which have organized this fall:

- ◆ "Central and Inner Asia"—Bill Chu (Demography and Anthropology) and Jay Dautcher (Anthropology and Folklore)
- ◆ "Communist and Post-Communist Societies"—Victoria Bonnell and Michael Burawoy (Sociology)
- ◆ "Post-Soviet 'Security' Studies"—Andrew Lynch (Political Science)

Two working groups from the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures have informally applied, one dealing with Bulgarian dialects under Professor Ronelle Alexander and one dealing with Semiotics and the Cultural History of Russia (initiated by Evgenii Bershtein).

## *Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education (CERGE)*

The doctoral program at CERGE of Charles University, Prague, provides post-graduate training in modern economics by Western trained professors from around the world. Two-year program taught in English, followed by two years of dissertation research. For application package and further information about fellowship opportunities, please contact: Office of Graduate Studies, CERGE-EI, P. O. Box 882, Politických veznu 7, 111 21 Praha 1, Czech Republic. Tel: (42 2) 2423 0280; Fax: (42 2) 2421 1374; e-mail: grad.stud@cerge.cuni.cz. Application deadline: March 15.



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# Poland's "Velvet Restoration": One Year After

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*Tomasz Grabowski, Ph.D. candidate,  
Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley*

Parties with communist roots are coming back to power in one East European country after another. Yet, last year's success of the Polish Socialist and Peasant parties is puzzling. Poland used to have the most developed opposition movement in East Europe, with the broadest social and territorial base. Only in Poland did the elements of institutional pluralism survive in the form of the Catholic Church, the carrier of alternative ideological and historical traditions. Sociological research throughout the 1980s documented enduring anti-communist and pro-market attitudes in the society. How did it happen that the old-regime figures are back in the limelight, often coming to the very same posts they left in disgrace five years ago?

Poland's latest surprise is neither a revival of the genuine Left nor a creeping restoration of the communist rule. Rather, it is a victory of pure organization over ideology and interest. In a society where organizational resources are scarce, politicians who have established organization at their disposal and all that comes with it—core membership, material assets, bureaucratic know-how, coalition-building skills—are in a distinctly advantageous position vis-à-vis political competitors.

## **What happened in 1993?**

The bewildering variety of the Polish parties can be reduced to five main currents: 1) the Socialists—the communist-successor party; 2) the Peasants—the communists' former satellite and ally; 3) a fragmented Center composed of parties which are the offshoots of the Solidarity movement; 4) an even more fragmented post-Solidarity Right; and 5) several new populist parties with roots neither in the old regime nor in Solidarity.

Compared to the 1991 election, support for the Solidarity-rooted parties went down from 50% to 40%. However, this translated into a meager 20% of seats in the Parliament since many of these parties

did not reach the required 5% electoral threshold. The new populist parties were thoroughly defeated. Finally, support for the Socialists and the Peasants combined doubled from 20% to 40%. But it converted into a 65% parliamentary majority.

One popular theory of what happened is society-centered and uses a deterministic language. Another is elite-centered and uses the language of voluntarism.

## **Faulting the society**

Some observers attribute the Left's victory to economic interests and/or cultural attitudes dominant in a post-communist society. The majority, it is said, rejected policies which led to unemployment, economic insecurity, and growing income inequalities. Above all, market reform threatened the interests of large social groups which used to be solidarity's political base: industrial workers and peasants. As a result, symbolic/affective voting which dominated in the early stages of the transition gave way to class and interest-based voting. Moreover, liberal reform clashed with the egalitarian and statist values deeply embedded in the popular political culture. The old-regime nostalgia led to the embracing of the former ruling parties.

This theory contains a grain of truth. Many groups have been hit hard by the new economic realities. Today more people are willing to call themselves leftists than a few years ago, and skepticism toward the market has grown. But a look at the electorate and program of the victorious party reveals the inadequacy of this explanation. The Socialists are more popular among the highly educated, white-collar and urban strata than among the less educated or the blue-collar workers. Amazingly, they won even among the private entrepreneurs, many of whom support accelerated market reform. Class voting? The Socialists look more like a classical catch-all party which seeks and receives support of groups with

conflicting economic interests. Programmatically, they often sound more like European-style liberals than Socialists.

## **Faulting the elite**

The second theory stresses the decisions of the main political actors: the series of unsolicited blunders on the part of the Solidarity politicians is seen as the cause of their undoing. In this vein, the Solidarity Center blames the Right for the inflammatory rhetoric of de-communization and the kow-towing to the most conservative elements in the Catholic Church. The resulting bills such as the harsh anti-abortion law are said to have turned off more moderate and secular voters. Conversely, the Right's argument is that the philosophy of forgiveness adopted after 1989 by the Mazowiecki government and its successors, its hyper legalistic approach, its reluctance to expose the criminal nature of communism prepared the ground for the Socialist comeback. The less involved observers speak more generally about the hubris and myopia of the Solidarity elites, who preoccupied with the enemy within, failed to see the enemy without.

The squandering of nearly 25% of votes by the coalition-adverse Solidarity politicians was undoubtedly a political mistake of the first order. In other respects, however, it is questionable that the disorganization and disunity of the former opposition camp can be attributed to bad leadership or poor political choices. All seventeen post-Solidarity parties could not have uniformly bad leaders. Simply pooling resources may not be enough if there are few resources to begin with.

## **Organization, stupid**

A better way to tackle the problem may be to ask: what do the two old regime-rooted parties have in common that all other parties lack? When studying the careers of parties as organizations, scholars have paid attention to such factors as membership, organizational density (the number



and size of local party units), the system of collateral and sponsored organizations, the size of bureaucratic apparatus, the material assets and so on. On all these counts, the resource differential between the old and the new parties is staggering. The Peasant party has 200,000 members down from a half million; the Socialists 60,000 down from 1.6 million. By contrast, the largest Solidarity party has fewer than 10,000 members. The Socialists have cells in most communes. The Solidarity-successor parties simply do not exist at the local level outside of the larger towns. The new parties have practically no sponsored or affiliated organizations either. The Socialists, on the other hand, lead an alliance of 28 organizations—trade unions, interest groups, single-issue associations—which are survivals from the communist era, when they had the state-granted monopoly in a given substantive area. The difference in material assets is no less revealing. Even though the Socialists relinquished most property of the Communist party, they continue to own several buildings, one national newspaper and a number of local newspapers. The Peasant party is the “Rockefeller” of Polish politics, as it maintained all assets from the previous era. The new parties have no property. They survive on money provided by the State to the parliamentarians.

As one Socialist politician told me: “Only two parties have national organization: we and the Peasants. It is a question of historical heritage and organizational continuity. There is continuity in human resources. There is continuity in knowledge of how to do things. There is continuity in locations.” This vast political experience has today made the Socialists a flexible electoral machine that puts vote maximization before any doctrinal consistency.

### Searching for a theory

These diverse organizational assets, indispensable in a day-to-day political competition, are the direct legacy of both parties’ exclusive political status in the communist era. Post-communist party-formation may

be the extreme example of the phenomenon described by Lipset and Rokkan<sup>1</sup> with respect to the party systems in the West. There, “survival of the first” is the rule: the early establishment of parties gave them a tremendous competitive advantage. The breakpoint was the transition to fully mobilized politics and universal suffrage, at which time party systems became largely “frozen.”

In Eastern Europe, in the late 1940s, the Communists and their satellites presided over the transition from the pre-war oligarchies to the fully mobilized politics. No matter how undemocratically, they became the first and only mass-incorporating parties in their societies. For the next forty years they remained so, and they effectively suppressed all organizational vestiges of alternative political traditions. After 1989, the resources they had accumulated could have been destroyed by revolutionary violence alone. You would have had to shoot Communists or to instill a widespread fear among the old-regime stalwarts to produce the massive transfer of organizational and human resources from the old to the new parties.

### What next?

Does the resurgence of parties with communist roots pose a threat to Poland’s liberal-democratic future? The answer is not unequivocal. The Left’s victory resulted in a surge of public confidence in democratic institutions, and it helped marginalize various proto-fascist parties. In the economy, the broad macroeconomic stabilization course has been maintained. The figures on growth, exports, budget deficit, and inflation are encouraging. At the same time, restructuring reforms, such as mass privatization, have been suspended. Short-term opportunism is the order of the day.

The latter is also true, but much more so, in the State domain. Bureaucratic streamlining has been put on hold. State power devolution to local councils has been put on hold. Welfare reform, health care reform, education reform have all been put

on hold. Instead, the government parties, especially the Peasants, are using patronage on a massive scale to render their electoral victory irreversible.

Before jumping to the conclusion that these are policy swings, well-known in established liberal democracies, it may be worthwhile to recall David Easton’s distinction among three levels of a political system: community, regime, and politics as usual.<sup>2</sup> According to Easton, you cannot have a consolidated democracy without a fundamental “decision” being reached on the first and second levels. Only then, the normal politics of “who gets what and how” may take hold.

Poland arguably possesses the social constitution of liberty at the community level, in the form of a predominantly civic population. But it has not reached the stage of political constitution at the regime level. There, the well-organized old parties face the disorganized Right; but the latter still wields considerable symbolic resources. The two sets of elites, standing for two deeply antagonistic historical traditions, are entrenched in different parts of the State apparatus. A chronic constitutional conflict and stalemate follow. For instance, the anti-communist President does not recognize the sovereignty of the Socialist-dominated Parliament in certain spheres, such as the military. The political consolidation and realignment on the Right, on the order of De Gaulle’s achievement in France, may well be the precondition for a lasting constitutional settlement. In its absence one should expect more, not less, political instability. ■

<sup>1</sup> Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> David Easton. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley, 1965.



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# Minority Rights in Hungary

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*as addressed by  
visiting scholar from Austria*

*During the fall semester, Peter Haslinger, from the Institute for East and Southeast European Research of the University of Vienna, was a visiting scholar at the Center. Dr. Haslinger proved a valuable resource for students and faculty alike. He studied at both the University of Vienna and the Eotvos-Lorand University, Budapest. Dr. Haslinger completed his Ph.D. in 1993. His doctoral thesis was entitled, "Hungarian Revisionism and the Burgenland 1922-1932." Within his historical research, Dr. Haslinger has, over the past few years, centered on minority studies, national stereotypes, and nationalism in East Central and Southeast Europe. He came to Berkeley to work on a major study, "The Border as a Motif in the History of East Central Europe 1880-1940: the Problem of Identity and Loyalty." However, at the end of the semester, he admitted to having worked on several different projects.*

*The Center sponsored two talks by Dr. Haslinger: "National Identity and Questions of Loyalty: Romanians of Transylvania, 1895-1914," on November 2; and "National Minorities in Hungary since 1989," on December 9. The latter was especially timely in that it preceded the first round of local elections in Hungary on December 11 in which the 1993 National Minority Law was to play an important role. Dr. Haslinger prepared the audience for the elections by providing some background. He discussed the problems facing the minorities who, "like the whole of Hungarian society, find themselves in a state of fundamental transition." The balance of this report summarizes Dr. Haslinger's talk.*

According to Dr. Haslinger, the ethnic minorities in Hungary can be divided into two groups—the gypsies and the non-gypsies. The percentage of gypsies in the population is estimated at 600,000, but it

is growing rapidly with a birth rate that is over the national average. Some estimates suggest that the population of gypsies in Hungary can be 1 million by the year 2000. The "mid-size" minorities include the Germans (estimated at 220,000); Slovaks (110,000); Croats (80,000); and Romanians (25,000). Finally, the "smaller minorities" are eight officially recognized groups, each of which number 5,000 or less: Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovenes, and Ukrainians.

In characterizing these minorities, Dr. Haslinger discussed points they have in common, such as an economic standard of living which, on the whole, is comparable to the Hungarian average (or, in the case of Germans and some of the smaller urban-based groups, even higher). In addition, politically and in part, culturally, they can be considered assimilated in terms of lifestyle, public appearance, and attitudes. They feel a sense of loyalty to the Hungarian state as well as to Hungarian society. To mitigate conflict, they manage a "double identity"—that is, the "political-civic identity" is predominantly Hungarian while the "identity of belonging to a minority group" is operative in local and rural contexts. This observation is manifest in the widespread aversion to declaring oneself as a member of an ethnic minority in any official setting, which Dr. Haslinger had noted in his research. In addition, until recently, knowledge of a minority language was not of personal advantage in such settings. Therefore, there had been a high degree of loss of language. Furthermore, the "soft" authoritarian structures of the Kadar regime after 1962 did not officially push assimilation nor provoke inner resistance within minority groups. Such a situation actually worked in favor of assimilation. In brief, the general climate did not promote political radicalization (with the possible exception of some Slovak groups).

Against this general background, Dr. Haslinger went into more detail about the current political situation in Hungary vis-à-vis minorities. He outlined some of the improvements in the fields of media and of education, providing minority programs, teaching of minority languages, and other moves. On July 7, 1993, "Act 77 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities" was passed by the Hungarian National Assembly. The act presented a catalogue of individual rights (such as free use of one's minority language before court, in matters of local administration and in parliament) and of collective rights. Under the latter, the concept of the "local minority self-governments," was envisioned. In addition, the act provided for nationwide rights by setting forth the concept of "minority self-government on the national level" (with representatives being elected by at least three-fourths of all the local representatives).

Dr. Haslinger pointed out that the law focussed on the very local level which "makes good sense" in minority issues. In all municipalities, each of the 13 officially recognized minorities was able to present its own "independent" candidate for a special ballot within the local elections. Voters in those municipalities which put forth minority candidates would then complete a fourth ballot in addition to the nationwide three (for district and county councils and for mayor). In the end, 660 minority candidates were submitted. Of that total 657 "minority councilors" were elected who will be in charge of social and cultural matters relating to their communities. Minority councilors were elected in 171 towns and 299 villages. The gypsies, who were given the status of a minority only three years ago, won the largest number of places with 434 successful candidates. All 105 candidates put up by the German minority won. Slovaks will have 31 municipal councilors, the Croats 42, the Serbs 18, and the Romanians 11. Armenians, Slo-



venes, Bulgarians, Greeks, Poles, and Ruthenians will have between them 16 seats. Only the Ukrainian minority, numbering a few hundred members, did not put forward a candidate.

The lecture turned to the practical activities which the minority councilors would be able to conduct and the source of funding for those activities. The speaker also presented some of the pitfalls which may arise with the concept of "minority local self-governments" including the possibility that such an administrative body might, under certain circumstances, find itself in charge of the infrastructural needs of the whole community and not just the minority members. Dr. Haslinger also addressed the motivation of the Antall government in accepting the National Minority Act in 1993, including the desire to move away from the statist model of former times and the desire to set an example for countries such

as Slovakia and Romania and thus perhaps influence minority policy in those countries. Finally, he discussed the gypsies in some detail, and their particular problems including lack of unity and difficulty in formulating common goals.

In sum, the audience benefitted from the lecture, especially as it set the stage for the coming elections. The significance of the National Minority Law and its progress is clear—especially in the face of conflicts among national minorities following the fall of communism. Perhaps a model lies here which can be utilized in the future. Or perhaps the situation in Hungary is about to explode. As Dr. Haslinger concluded, "... after decades of silence the minority question in Hungary is about to become politicized ...[we may see] rising interethnic tension certainly going with the implementation of the minority law in the next two or three months." ■

## ORIAS

Educators at all levels will be interested to know about the new Office for Resources in International and Area Studies. Inaugurated at the beginning of fall '94 semester, this unit both promotes and coordinates the in-service and consultative activities of UC Berkeley's various area studies centers. ORIAS provides a wide range of services, including speakers for classrooms and for staff development programs, curriculum materials, workshops, and summer programs. For more information, contact ORIAS, 510/643-0868 or by e-mail at [orias@uclink.berkeley.edu](mailto:orias@uclink.berkeley.edu). Or write, ORIAS, 342 Stephens Hall, UC Berkeley, Berkeley CA 94720-2300.





## The Current Prospects for Armenia—A Symposium

*Friday, March 3, 1995, 1 p.m.–5:30 p.m.  
Lipman Room, 8th Floor, Barrows Hall  
University of California, Berkeley*

### *List of Participants:*

#### **Armen Baibourtian**

Consul General of the Republic of Armenia, Los Angeles

#### ***The Republic of Armenia as a Member of the International Community***

#### **George W. Breslauer (moderator)**

Professor of Political Science  
Chair, Department of Political Science,  
UC Berkeley

#### **Richard Hovannisian**

Professor of Armenian and Near  
Eastern History, UC Los Angeles

#### ***Does History Really Repeat Itself?***

***Armenia 1918-1920 and Armenia in the 1990's***

#### **Onnic Marashian**

Editor-in-Chief, *Platt's Oilgram News*  
and Head of News, *Platt's Energy*  
Information Group

#### ***Pipeline Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Armenia's Stake***

#### **Daniel Sneider**

Visiting Fellow, Center for International  
Studies and Arms Control, Stanford  
University; Correspondent, *Christian*  
*Science Monitor*

#### ***The Geopolitics of the Karabagh Conflict***

#### **Ronald Grigor Suny**

Professor of Political Science,  
University of Chicago

#### ***Imagining a New Armenia: Democratic Politics in the Post Soviet World***

#### **Jonathan Walters**

Country Economist, The World Bank

#### ***Prospects for Armenia's Economic Development***

*Co-sponsored by the Center for Slavic and East European Studies; the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies; the Center for Middle East Studies; UC Berkeley Armenian Alumni; UC Berkeley Armenian Students Association; and the American University of Armenia*

## ***Armenian Studies at UC Berkeley***

On December 12, 1994, the Vice Chancellor Carol Christ officiated over the dedication ceremony of the Krouzian Study Center for the William Saroyan Chair in Armenian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. The ceremony was held at 251 Barrows Hall and followed by a luncheon at the Women's Faculty Club.

The Krouzian Study Center Endowment in support of Armenian Studies was set by a generous gift from Krikor Krouzian and Zovinar Krouzian Davidian in memory of their parents. The dedication ceremony, well-attended by friends and family, was but one event to mark the initiation of an active program in Armenian Studies. In addition to the Study Center to be established at 251 Barrows Hall, a half-day conference is planned for Friday, March 3, on the current situation in Armenia. Beginning in the fall of 1995, invited scholars will regularly offer lecture courses on contemporary Armenia as well as reading and/or independent courses for interested students. The Center is helping to organize this program. Questions concerning events can be directed to Dr. Barbara Voytek, Executive Director, at 510/643-6736.



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# Calendar of Events

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Please note: for current information on Center events, please call (510) 642-3230. Even if no one is available to help you, you can listen to a recorded listing of events that is updated every Friday afternoon.

Friday, January 27

**Panel Discussion.** *Chechnya and the Russian Federation.* Johanna Nichols, professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures; Edward Walker, Executive Director, Berkeley Program in Soviet Studies; Daniel Sneider, correspondent, *Christian Science Monitor*. 3-5:30 p.m. 215 Moses, Conference Room.

Tuesday, January 31

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Svetozar Koljevic, Professor, Dept of English, University of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia. *Nationalism as Literary Inspiration: a View from Sarajevo.* Noon, 442 Stephens Hall.

Tuesday, February 7

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Igor Zevelev, Head Research Associate, IMEMO. *Building the State and Building the Nation in Russia: 1991-1994.* Noon, 270 Stephens Hall.

Tuesday, February 7

**Slide Lecture.** Elena Yablonsky. First lecture in the series: **Pre-Revolutionary Art and Architecture in Russia.** See description within this newsletter. 442 Stephens. 4 p.m.

Thursday, February 9 and Tuesday, February 14

**Slide Lectures.** Elena Yablonsky. Second and third lectures in the series: **Pre-Revolutionary Art and Architecture in Russia.** See description within this newsletter.

Saturday, February 11

**Teachers' Workshop.** *From Revolution to Transition: A Comparison of China and the Soviet Union.* World Affairs Council, 312 Sutter Street, San Francisco. 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. Developed by the UC Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies and the Center for Slavic and East European Studies. The workshop is for K-12 teachers. Enrollment fee is \$10, and enrollment in advance is advised. Participation is limited to teachers and other educational professionals. For more information, contact: Beth Shepard at the Center 510/642-5245 or bshepard@uclink2.berkeley.edu.

Monday, February 13

**Public Lecture.** Yuri Orlov, senior scientist/physicist, Cornell University's Newman Laboratory of Nuclear Studies, and human rights activist. *The Rise of the Red and the Brown in Russia.* 4 p.m., 270 Stephens Hall.

Wednesday, February 15

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Jonathan Kapiloff, Ph.D. candidate in history. *Kaganovich in Nizhnii Novgorod, 1918-1919.* Noon. 270 Stephens.

Thursday, February 16; and Tuesday, February 21

**Slide Lectures.** Elena Yablonsky. Fourth and fifth lectures in

series: **Pre-Revolutionary Art and Architecture in Russia.** See description within this newsletter.

Wednesday, February 22

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Catherine Bracewell, professor of history at the School for Slavonic Studies, London University. *Women and Nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia.* Noon. 442 Stephens.

Thursday, February 23

**Slide Lecture.** Elena Yablonsky. Sixth lecture in series: **Pre-Revolutionary Art and Architecture in Russia.** See description within this newsletter.

Monday, February 27

**Colloquium.** Alexei Kojevnikov, professor of history and philosophy of science, Indiana University. *Ideology and Practice of Scientific Schools in the Former USSR.* Co-sponsored by History of Science and Technology. 4:30 pm. location TBA.

Tuesday, February 28

**Slide Lecture.** Elena Yablonsky. Final lecture in series: **Pre-Revolutionary Art and Architecture in Russia.** See description within this newsletter.

Wednesday, March 1

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Leonid A. Beliaev, Chief, Department of Moscow Archaeology, Institute of Archaeology, Moscow. *Ancient Moscow Monasteries from an Historical and Archaeological View.* with slides. Noon, 442 Stephens.

Friday, March 3

**Mini Conference.** Current Prospects for Armenia. 2-6 p.m. Lipman Room. 8th Floor of Barrows Hall. (Program can be found elsewhere in the newsletter.)

Saturday, March 4

**Symposium and Film Showing.** *When Ivan Met Mickey: Walt Disney's Mark on Sergei Eisenstein.* Program to be confirmed but will include film and panel discussion. Pacific Film Archive, 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.

Tuesday, March 7

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Gilbert Rozman, professor of sociology, Princeton University. *Northeast Asian Regionalism: Multinational Scholarship and Training in Russia, China and Japan.* Noon. 270 Stephens.

Wednesday, March 8

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Leonid Khotin, Research Associate, CSEES. Topic: TBA. Noon. 270 Stephens.

Thursday, March 9

**Public Lecture.** Sheila Fitzpatrick, professor of history, University of Chicago. *The Uses of Literacy: Denunciations and Other Public Epistolary Practices in Stalin's Russia.* 270 Stephens. 4 p.m.  
*continued on next page*



## *Calendar, continued*

*Wednesday, March 15*

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Mikhail Gulyaev, degree candidate at California State University, Fresno; formerly with *The Moscow Times*. *Mass Media and Ideology in Contemporary Russia*. 270 Stephens. Noon.

*Friday, March 17*

**XIX Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference.** *Time and Money in Russian Culture*. Lipman Room. 8th Floor of Barrows Hall. 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. (see program elsewhere in Newsletter) Co-sponsored by the Center for Russian and East European Studies, Stanford University.

*Wednesday, March 22*

**Brown Bag Lunch.** Gayane Hagopian, visiting scholar, department of linguistics. *The Godmother: Is She Necessary to Baptize the Son? (Baptism/Kinship Terms in Armenia)*. Noon. 270 Stephens.

*Thursday, March 23*

**Annual Colin Miller Memorial Lecture.** Nina Tumarkin, professor of history and director of the Russian Area Studies Program at Wellesley College. *The Agony of Victory: Russia Remembers World War II*. Location TBA. 4 p.m.

*April 7-9*

**Annual Outreach Conference.** *Identities in Transition: Gender, Class, Nationality, and Religion*. Program to be confirmed. Alumni House.

## *Pre-Revolutionary Art and Architecture in Russia*

*Elena Yablonsky, Historian and Curator at the Armory, the Moscow Kremlin Museum, will conduct a series of slide lectures during February. They are free and open to the public. The 4 p.m. lectures are in 442 Stephens Hall. The 8 p.m. lectures are in 160 Kroeber Hall. Please call the Center for further information: 642-3230.*

*Tuesday, February 7, 4:00 p.m.*

### *Russian Architecture from the 12th to the 17th Centuries*

The magnificent monuments of Russian architecture from the 12th to the 17th centuries; the old wooden and masonry churches; the Kremlin churches at Novgorod, Pskov, Rostov, Vladimir, and Suzdal as compared with those in Moscow.

*Thursday, February 9, 8:00 p.m.*

### *The History of Russian Icon Painting*

The history of Russian icon painting of the 12th to the 17th centuries; Byzantine influence; the principal themes; the local traditions and specific features of icon paintings from the Novgorod, Pskov, and Moscow schools; the development of Russian iconostasis.

*Tuesday, February 14, 4:00 p.m.*

### *Masterpieces from the Kremlin*

Masterpieces from the Kremlin workshops produced by goldsmiths, silversmiths, gunsmiths and others at the Russian Academy of Arts in the 17th century; includes applied arts, elaborate embroideries, etc.

*Thursday, February 16, 8:00 p.m.*

### *Russian Painting*

The works of the gifted Russian artists Simon Ushakov, Iosif Vladimirov, Fyodor Kolov, and others.

*Tuesday, February 21, 4:00 p.m.*

### *Russian Culture in the 17th Century*

Some aspects in the development of the Russian culture in the 17th century; influences from Western Europe in the second half of the 17th century.

*Thursday, February 23, 8:00 p.m.*

### *Russian Culture in the 18th Century*

Some aspects in the development of Russian culture in the 18th century; Peter the Great as the famous reformer, Elizabeth, and Catherine the Great.

*Tuesday, February 28, 4:00 p.m.*

### *Russian Jewelry Art from the 12th to the Early 20th Centuries*

The history of Russian jewelry art from the 12th to the beginning of the 20th centuries, from the oldest surviving works to the famous Faberge eggs.

*Co-sponsored by the Slavic Center, Townsend Center for the Humanities, the Kazakh-American Research Project, and the Department of Anthropology.*



# Fellowships and Other Opportunities

**Travel Grants.** *The Center's US Department of Education Title VI grant provides limited travel support for Center-affiliated graduate students and faculty. Awards of up to \$300 are made to those presenting a paper at a meeting of a recognized scholarly organization. Awards are made on a first-come, first-serve basis. To apply, call Beth Shepard at 642-5245 (mornings).*

## American Council for Learned Societies

### Conferences on Eastern Europe.

Dealing with collaborative research projects designed to promote the development of East European area studies. Up to \$25,000 for research conferences; \$7,500 for workshops or seminars; \$2,500 for planning meetings. Deadline: March 14. Contact: Jason H. Parker at the address below.

*Application forms for the above grant must be requested in writing from the Office of Fellowships and Grants, American Council of Learned Societies, 228 East 45th Street, New York NY 10017-3398. No part of the inquiry or application procedure may be conducted by fax.*

**BURK** (U of Pittsburgh Center for Russian & Eastern European Studies/Business in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan Program). Offers travel and research opportunities to business and economics faculty from US academic institutions in the above-mentioned countries as well as Albania, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia. For non-specialists in East European studies. James V. Palmer, BURK Project Coordinator, CREES, 4G17 Forbes Quadrangle, Pittsburgh PA 15260. Tel (412) 648-7418. Fax (412) 648-2199. e-mail: crees@vms.cis.pitt.edu

**Center for German and European Studies, UCB.** Entering graduate student merit fellowships in modern European studies. Nominations should be submitted by sponsoring department or professional

school. Nominations should include student's complete application file and a letter of nomination from the department. These should be sent to: Director, Center for German and European Studies, 254 Moses Hall #2316, UC Berkeley 94720-2316. For additional information, please call (510)643-5777.

### Center for Studies in Higher Education.

Grants for doctoral dissertation research to cover travel, per diem, photocopying, etc. Research must be at least broadly related to study of higher education. Deadlines: March 1 and May 1. Contact: Barbara Briscoe at 642-0573. (babrisco@uclink.berkeley.edu).

### Council for International Exchange of Scholars.

Fulbright opportunities for university lecturing or advanced research. Competition opens March 1; application deadline: August 1. Contact: CIES, 3007 Tilden St., NW, Ste. 5M, Box GNEWS, Washington DC 20008-3009; Tel (202) 686-7877; Fax (202)362-3442; e-mail: cies1@ciesnet.cies.org.

**FLAS Fellowships.** Deadlines: Academic Year Fellowships—for New Students: February 10; for Continuing Students: February 24. Summer Fellowships: February 3. For information, contact Graduate Fellowship Office, Sproul. 643-7477.



**Hokkaido University's Slavic Research Center.** Foreign Visiting Fellowship Program, Juen 1996 through March 1997. Deadline: March 31, 1995. Head, Foreign Visiting Fellowship Program, Slavic Research Ctr., Hokkaido U., Kita-9, Nishi-7, Kita-ku, Sapporo 060, Japan. Tel. 011-706-3156. Fax. 011-709-9283.

**The Hoover Institution at Stanford University.** Post-doctoral research fellowships. Academic year grants for nine to twelve months (\$25,000) or summer grants (\$3,000). Must have a Ph.D., affiliation with a university or research institute, US citizenship or permanent residence and a need to use the Hoover archives and library collections. Deadline: March 15. Contact: Richard F. Staar, Hoover Institution, Stanford CA 94305-1348.

### Institute for the Study of World Politics.

Dissertation Fellowships. Dissertations in political science, international relations, economics, and history. Deadline: February 15, 1995. The Institute also administers the Dorothy Danforth Compton Fellowships for minority group students of world affairs. ISWP, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington DC 20036.

### International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX).

- ◆ Short-Term Travel Grants (Baltic States; Central and Eastern Europe; Mongolia; Newly Independent States). For scholarly projects, for brief visits, including presentations at scholarly conferences. Deadlines: February 1, 1995; June 1, 1995.
- ◆ Special Projects in the Study of Central & Eastern Europe and Eurasia: March 1, 1995.
- ◆ USIA-funded Summer Language Teacher Exchange for College and University Instructors of Russian and the languages of the Newly Independent States (NIS). Mid-June to early

*continued on next page*



## *Fellowships, continued*

August. Language instruction with an emphasis on teaching methodology at universities in Russia and the NIS. US citizenship or permanent residency required. Applicants for the program in Russia must have four years of college-level Russian or the equivalent, be employed as teachers of Russian at the college or university level, and have a minimum of two years teaching experience. Applicants for training in non-Russian languages must have intermediate to advanced knowledge of the language and two years teaching experience. Advanced graduate students with similar experience who demonstrate special competence will also be considered. Deadline: February 24, 1995 for participation during the summer of 1995.

*IREX, 1616 H Street, N.W., Washington DC 20006; Tel (202) 628-8188; Fax (202) 628-8189. irex%irexmain@irex.org*

**Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.** Short-term Grants (up to one month's duration) to be spent at the Institute in Washington. Deadlines: March 1, and June 1, 1995. Kennan Institute/Woodrow Wilson Center, 370 L'Enfant Promenade, SW, Ste. 704, Washington DC 20024; Tel (202) 287-3400; Fax (202) 287-3772; Bitnet: w2wcem116@sivm; Internet: wwcem116@sivm.si.edu. No applications by fax or e-mail will be considered.

**MacArthur Foundation Initiative in the Former Soviet Union.** Fund for Foreign Travel. Grants for individuals in the FSU with no alternative funding to participate in workshops and conferences abroad. MacArthur Foundation, 5520 North Magnolia Ave., Chicago IL 60640-1307. Tel (312) 728-6996; Fax (312) 728-6886.

**Monterey Institute of International Studies.** Merit scholarships for students admitted to the Russian program of the Translation and Interpretation Division.

### **1995 Yale-Hopkins Summer Seminar**

"The Peoples of Russia and the CIS." Ten days of seminars and workshops, held at Yale, Hopkins, and Choate July 17-28. Designed for educators grades K-12. Admission is by competitive application. Contact Brian Carter, Yale REES Outreach, P. O. Box 208206, New Haven CT 06520-8206. Tel (203) 432-3424. No deadline but applications received by April 1 have priority.

Application deadline: April 21. Admissions Office, 425 Van Buren St., Monterey CA 93940. (408) 647-4128.

**NAFSA-Association of International Educators.** Workshop for International Educators. "Issues in Advising and Teaching Students from Russia and Ukraine." April 6-8, 1995. Syracuse NY. Registration Deadline: March 15, 1995. Elizabeth Bell, NAFSA, 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1000, Washington DC 20009-5728. Tel (202) 462-4811. Fax: (202) 667-3419; e-mail: inbox@nafsa.org

**National Research Council** Collaborative Research in Sectoral Policy—1995. Support for collaborative research between US specialists and colleagues from the former Soviet Union and Central/Eastern Europe in fields of public policy requiring substantial input from the applied sciences. Provides travel funds to the FSU and CEE. Deadline: March 10, 1995. Contact: Office for Central Europe and Eurasia (FO2014); ATTN: CRSP, National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington DC 20418. Inquiries: Ms. Kelly Robbins, Tel (202) 334-2644; Fax (202) 334-2614, Internet: krobbs@nas.edu

**Slavic Center Mellon Dissertation Write-up Grants.** To assist advanced graduate students with expenses incurred

during the final write-up of a dissertation. Awards do not exceed \$3,000. UCB Ph.D. candidates are eligible; only one Mellon write-up grant during a graduate career. Submit: 1) dissertation prospectus; 2) statement of progress to date on the dissertation, indicating expected filing date; (3) statement of financial need (estimated income and expenses); and (4) two letters of reference from dissertation committee members, confirming the expected filing date. Submit to: Victoria E. Bonnell, Chair, Center for Slavic & East European Studies, Attn: Dissertation Grants, 361 Stephens Hall. Deadline: March 15.

**Social Science Research Council (SSRC).** Research Workshop Competition. Workshops must be initiated by recipients of SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowships in International Peace and Security (past and present). Application deadline: February 15, 1995. Contact International Peace and Security Program, SSRC (address below).

**SSRC-administered Grants for Study of the Soviet Union and Its Successor States (for US citizens)**

- ♦ Faculty and Professional Development Grants. Up to \$7,500 to support post-doctoral scholars in acquiring additional skills in language and methodology. Deadline: March 1, 1995.



- ◆ Research and Development Grants. To support meetings, workshops, and pilot projects. Maximum award is \$7,500. Deadlines: March 1, 1995, and September 15, 1995.
- ◆ Three-day Workshop on nationalism and cultural citizenship in Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia. Chicago, May 19-21, 1995. Applicants should submit: a copy of their dissertation research proposal or an 8-10 page outline or abstract of completed research; a current cv; a cover letter explaining the contribution of their project to the workshop.

Complete applications should be sent no later than February 15 to: Southeast Asia Program (address below).

*For further information: Social Science Research Council, 605 Third Avenue, NYC 10158; Tel (212) 661-0280; Fax (212) 370-7896.*

**Townsend Center for the Humanities, Human Rights Program.** Fellowships for UCB and GTU students to enable them to do internships with human rights organizations. \$2,500 is allocated for each internship. Applications due end of February 1995. Contact: Rita Maran, Human Rights

Program, Townsend Center. Tel: 642-0965. Fax: 643-5284. email: ritamara@uclink2

**East European Studies, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.** Short-Term Grants: Stipend of \$80 per day for up to thirty days for research in Washington. Deadlines: March 1, and June 1, 1995. Contact: John R. Lampe, Director, East European Studies, The Woodrow Wilson Center, 370 L'Enfant Promenade, SW, Ste. 704, Washington DC 20024; Tel (202) 287-3000, ext. 222; Fax (202) 287-3772.





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# Associates of the Slavic Center

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*The Center acknowledges with sincere appreciation the following individuals who have contributed to the annual giving program, the Associates of the Slavic Center, between September 1, 1994, and January 15, 1995. Financial support from the Associates is vital to our program of research, training, and extra curricular activities. We would like to thank all members of ASC for their generous assistance. (♦ signifies gift of continuing membership)*

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# Membership

*For those of you who are not yet members, we encourage you to join. We believe you will enjoy the stimulating programs; even if you cannot participate as often as you might wish, your continuing contribution critically supports the Center's mission and goals.*

**Members (\$50 to \$100).** Members of ASC regularly receive Newsletter "Updates" and special mailings to notify them of last-minute events and special activities, such as cultural performances and major conferences.

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**Benefactors (\$500-up).** ASC Benefactors will also be our guests at the dinner and evening programs associated with our

annual conferences, such as the annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference in the spring. Benefactors are also entitled to complimentary copies of the books published by the Center on major developments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

**Center Circle (\$1,000-up).** In addition to enjoying the above-mentioned benefits, donors within the **Center Circle** will also become Robert Gordon Sproul Associates of the University. As such, they are invited to the Chancellor's annual black tie banquet and to luncheons before the major football games. They also receive membership in the Faculty Club and twenty other worldwide faculty clubs. The names of donors of \$1,000 or more appear in the Annual Report of Private Giving.

*It is a policy of the University of California and the Berkeley Foundation that a portion of the gifts and/or income therefrom is used to defray the costs of raising and administering the funds. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law.*



## Associates of the Slavic Center

Send your check, made payable to the Regents of the University of California, to the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, 361 Stephens Hall, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720. Attn: ASC

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*The Center for Slavic & East European Studies, UC Berkeley, and the  
Center for Russian and East European Studies, Stanford University, present*

***The XIXth Annual Berkeley-Stanford Conference***

**Time and Money in Russian Culture**

Lipman Room Friday, March 17, 1995  
8th Floor, Barrows Hall 9:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m.

9:30 a.m.

***Keynote Speech***

Kenneth Jowitt, UC Berkeley  
***Time and Money in Leninist Systems***

10:30–12 noon

***Time and Money in Imperial Russian***

Terence Emmons, Stanford University  
Stephen Moeller-Sally, Stanford University  
Viktor Zhivov, UC Berkeley

*Commentator:* Reginald Zelnik, UC Berkeley

1:30–3:00 p.m.

***Time and Money in the Soviet Union***

Stephen Hanson, University of Washington  
Eric Naiman, UC Berkeley

*Commentator:* Yuri Slezkine, UC Berkeley\*

\*to be confirmed

3:30–5:00 p.m.

***Time and Money in Post-Communist Russia***

Michael Burawoy, UC Berkeley  
David Woodruff, UC Berkeley

*Commentator:* Gregory Freidin, Stanford  
University

Center for Slavic and East European Studies  
*International and Area Studies*  
361 Stephens Hall  
University of California  
Berkeley, CA 94720 USA  
IV13  
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